



# State of the Insurgency

Trends, Intentions and Objectives

Classification of this briefing:

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## *Purpose*




**Provide an overview of the current capacity, capabilities and intentions of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan**

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# Insurgency Overview



- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation , training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

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### **Overall insurgent strategy going into 2010 (despite increases in ISAF troop strength)**

- Increase base of support (continue to expand into West and North)
- Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, esp., Coalition partners
- Undermine efforts of good governance
- Consolidate Command and Control, especially in the South
- Strengthen leadership and unity of effort throughout the country
- Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
- Increase influence around urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul

### **Mid year adjustment of Taliban strategy**

- Leverage tribal influence to gain popular support
- Improve command and control and operational security
- Delegitimize participation in GIRoA
- Expand operations in the West and North

### **Taliban overarching goals:**

- Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan
- Undermine GIRoA's authority and perceptions of security
- Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar


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

## What This Means




- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIRoA weakness
- International support for development has not met population's expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

In COIN, catch up ball does not work



## Taliban Code of Conduct published by Taliban leadership, Mid July 2009 (Mullah Omar's COIN guidance – a population centric strategy)

- “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe. Do not let those people that love money take our local people’s property and cause them problems.”
- “Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide / separate you.”

### Intentions

- We don't have to beat ISAF militarily, just outlast international will to remain in Afghanistan
- Continue population outreach and protection programs
- Continue successful asymmetric operations
- Expand lethal IED and high-profile attacks to deny ISAF freedom of movement
- Emphasize increasing violence in RC North and RC West
- Demonstrate Taliban reach and perceived control of all Afghanistan
- Make the main enemy the United States


### Directives

- Reiterated prohibitions on the following:
  - Mistreating population
  - Forcibly taking personal weapons
  - Taking children to conduct jihad
  - Punishment by maiming
  - Forcing people to pay donations
  - Searching homes
  - Kidnapping people for money


Use the winter months to build on perceived successes



# Taliban Governance



- **Inner Shura:** Supreme Ruling body; makes decisions within Omar's guidance
- **Greater Shura / Committees:** Rule on local issues that Shura leaders take to a national-level Shura
- **Local Shura:** Based on functional requirements, meeting needs of the Inner or Central Shura




- **Inner Shura:** Supreme ruling body; decisions based on consensus and within Omar's guidance
- **Regional Shura / Committees:** Direct and oversee policy; limited decision-making authority
- **Provincial Shura:** Enforces and implements directives; represents local concerns

\* Decision delays as fighters require guidance from smaller core of TBSL decision-makers



# Security Rollup



Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data as of 15 December 2009 reporting.

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


# IED Evolution in Afghanistan





2007 – 2009  
 Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME)  
 (80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate)  
 Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308)


IEDs by Type



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09





2003 – 2006  
 Predominantly Military Ordnance  
 Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473)  
 \* No IED related casualty data available for 2003




# Ammonium Nitrate (AN) Use



- AN based explosives, found in approx 85 percent of all main charge IEDs, are most common form of explosives
- AN fertilizer accounts for as little as five percent of all legitimate fertilizer use in Afghan Theater of Operations, banning would have a minimal effect on Agriculture
- AN is explosive in its raw state, but more powerful when mixed with diesel fuel, aluminium powder, sugar and fuel oil are often used
- Pakistan is the principle source of AN entering ATO, China and Iran are also significant suppliers



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
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
## Main Charge Size Trends



IED Main Charge Weight  
May 2008



IED Main Charge Weight  
Dec 2009



- Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased
- Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology
- The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taleban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen)


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## *The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely*

### • **Weapons and Ammunition:**

- Small arms weapons and ammunition readily available throughout the region
- Increased availability of IED and HME materials and technology



### • **Funding:** External funding is top-down, while internal funding is bottom-up, providing Taliban a consistent stream of money to sufficiently fund operations:

- **Internal:** Significant amount from opiate trade
  - Most reliable, accessible source of funds
  - Taxes; narcotics nexus; corruption
- **External:** Originate in Islamic states
  - Delivered via couriers and hawalas



### • **Recruits:**

- Retain the religious high-ground
- Able to recruit from frustrated population
- Exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack of governance





## OVERALL TRENDS:

- 2009 perceived as most successful year of the war for INS
- Expanded violence viewed as INS victory
- Elections viewed as INS success; low turnout; fraud

## COMMAND AND CONTROL:

- INS attempting to solidify command structure
- Directed leadership replacement causing friction with local elements
- TBSL reestablishing strategic vision; wants TB seen as fair, uncorrupt
- View Al Qaeda as a handicap – view that is increasingly prevalent

## POLITICS:


- Renewed focus on becoming a legitimate government
- Expand shadow governance

## MOTIVATIONS:

- U.S. seen as desiring permanent presence in Afghanistan
- Promised infrastructure projects incomplete, ineffective
- Karzai government universally seen as corrupt and ineffective
- Crime and corruption pervasive amongst security forces

## DIIRS By Category

- Atmospheric
- Training
- Corruption
- Facilitation
- INS Biographics
- Anti-Election
- Threat to population
- Propaganda
- Financing
- INS Capabilities
- INS Attack
- Threat to CF





### *The Taliban retains required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity*

#### • Domestic

- Leverage Omar's Islamic credentials to transcend tribal issues
- Exploit corruption to generate funds, gain access, and secure protection

#### • Regional / International – State

- Known State relationships create tension
- Current AFG TB vision if they return to power is to re-establish good relations with Islamic and Regional States
- Careful not to antagonize Islamabad or Tehran in order to mitigate against crackdown on safe havens or support systems

#### • Regional / International – Non-state

- Manage relationship with AQ to avoid alienating Afghan population, but encourage support from global jihad network
- Manage relationship with Pakistani militant groups to encourage reduced attacks in Pakistan, but encourage support for efforts in Afghanistan
- Mutually supportive relationship with Chechen and Central Asian fighters



## The insurgency is confident ...

### Most Likely

- Goal: Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach
- Operations:
  - Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces
  - Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas
  - Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west
  - Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides
- Impact:
  - ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers
  - Reduced international support for Afghanistan
  - Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA
  - Reduced support for ANSF
  - Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency

### Most Dangerous

- Goal: Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population
- Operations:
  - More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw
  - Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas
  - Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west
  - Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters
- Impact:
  - Reduced security in population centers
  - Significant loss of international support
  - Open popular frustration with GIRoA
  - Popular enmity toward ANSF
  - Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors

***... looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.***



## ***Strengths***

- Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding
- Strength and ability of shadow governance increasing
- Much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations
- IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; as much a tactic and process as it is a weapon
- Speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign -- this is their main effort

## ***Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities***

- Comprised of multiple locally-based tribal networks
- Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership at local levels
- Dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of Pashtun population
- Over-reliance on external support





- **Pakistan is as or more complex than Afghanistan**
  - Tribal and religion overtones, yet strong national identity, multiple ethnicities, most desire some form of democracy, a worsening economy but a nuclear weapons state
- **Foreign intervention resented in most of the country**
  - Predominantly an Indian issue, but strong resentment against the US and UK; appears to be growing against Taliban
- **Tribal values and traditional core beliefs still dominate large parts of the country**
  - “Outsiders” trying to impose new ideas and beliefs create tension; nature of tribal traditions can supersede Islam
- **Army is perceived to be more capable (and dependable) than the government**
  - Regarded as a positive influence in the FATA and NWFP because they are locally recruited and able to work within local systems
- **Large numbers of internally displaced people from years of fighting, a poor economy and natural disasters**
  - Potential breeding ground for the Taliban...but offers opportunities for counter-radicalization programs
- **Violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the GoP**
  - Demonstrates an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment

Staying the course in Pakistan as important as staying the course in Afghanistan




# Time is Running Out




- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces

### Kinetic Events by Geography




### Kinetic Events by Week and Type



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### Taliban Shadow Governors



- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)



### ***The situation is serious -- significant change is required.***

- We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed
- Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability and support to pose a threat to GIRoA's viability (they are most coherent in the south)
- Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse
- New strategy will incur risks -- not properly executing the strategy has greater risk
  - Longer war
  - Greater casualties
  - Higher overall costs
  - Loss of political support
- Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions
- Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure
- Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way



# Questions / Discussion


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## Possible IED Cell Structure




- An IED cell needs the following: financing, access to munitions/explosives, an IED architect/maker, someone to survey an attack site, someone to emplace the IED, and someone to initiate the IED.
- Although no two cells are likely to be the same and one person may fulfill multiple roles in a given cell, below is a potential diagram of an IED cell.






**The Improvised Explosive Device (IED)**  
*(The insurgent's choice of a weapon and a tactic)*



**The Population is the Center of Gravity – not the IED**



# How Do We Solve the Problem?



*Ultimately, We Win by Doing COIN Better*